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REAL PROPERTY-EASEMENTS-EXTINCTION OF EASEMENTS CREATED
IMPLICATION OR PRESCRIPTION ON SALE OF SERVIENT LAND TO BoNA
FIDE PURCHASER-Plaintiffs and defendants owned adjoining farms. About
thirty years ago their predecessors in title had constructed an underground tile
drain from plaintiffs' farm to and across defendants' farm. In r934 this drain
was obstructed. In 1941 the servient farm was sold to defendants, who gave
value and had no knowledge of the existence of the drain. Plaintiffs sought
an injunction to compel removal of the obstruction. The lower court found
that plaintiffs had acquired a prescriptive right to use the drain before it was
obstructed, but refused to grant the injunction on the ground that defendants
BY

RECENT DECISIONS

as bona fide purchasers had taken the servient land free of the easement. On
appeal, held, reversed. An easement created by prescription or implication 1 is
not extinguished by sale of the servient land, even ·to a bona-fide purchaser.
McKeonv. Brammer, (Iowa 1947) 29 N.W. (2d) 518.
An easement, whether created by written conveyance, prescription, or
implication/ is a legal property interest.8 At common law plaintiffs' easement
would not have been affected by a subsequent conveyance of the servient land,
because of the familiar rule that priority in right as between competing legal
interests is determined by priority in time, notice being immaterial. Inasmuch
as easements created by implication and prescription are not based upon written
instruments, the usual recording act should have no application to them.4 On
this basis the decision in the principal case seems unassailable. There is, how;ver, much authority for the contrary view taken by the trial court. 5 Reasons
advanced for such a holding are as follows: (a) Some authorities, mistakenly
believing that easements are equities, have misapplied the common law rule
that a bona fide purchaser of a legal interest in land takes free of prior competing equities.6 (b) Many courts have misapplied the "apparency" test (properly
used to determine whether an easement of implication has been created) 7 to
the question whether an existing easement is extinguished on sale of the servient
land to a bona fide purchaser. 8 ( c) Many courts in the United States, accustomed to treating the preservation of all interests in land against subsequent
purchasers as depending on the existence of actual or constructive notice,9 have
1
Since the supreme court accepted the trial court's conclusion that an easement
had been created by prescription (principal case at 521), the discussion of easements
created by implication appears obiter.
2
For a general explanation of these types of easements, see 5 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,§§ 467,457,474 (1944); BURBY, REAL PROPERTY,§ 65 (1943).
8
Schwann v. Cotton, [1916] 2 Ch. 459; principal case at 522; 28 C.J.S.,
Easements, § 22.
4
Aigler, "The Operation of the Recording Acts," 22 MICH. L. REv. 405
(1924); I PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 6b (1936).
5
17 AM. JuR., Easements, § 128, and cases cited.
6
Among the cases cited in 17 AM. JuR., Easements, § 128 as authority for its
declaration of the rule are Houston v. Zahm, 44 Ore. 610, 76 P. 641 (1904); and
Willoughby v. Lawrence, 116 Ill. 11, 4 N.E. 356 (1886), both cases involving
equitable interests. See also Smith v. Lockwood, 100 Minn. 221, 110 N.W. 980
(1907), involving an easement created by implication and purporting to follow
Swedish-American Bank v. Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co., 83 Minn. 377,
86 N.W. 420 (1901), a case involving an equity.
7
See 5 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 474 (1944); Van Sandt v. Royster, 148
Kan. 495, 83 P. (2d) 698 (1938).
8
Principal case at 523. See the list of cases cited by appellant's counsel in Wiesel
v. Smira, 49 R.I. 246, 142 A. 148 (1928), 58 A.L.R. 818 at 819 (1929).
9
The over-emphasis of notice would seem to have been fostered by the prevalent
explanation of the recording acts in terms of constructive notice. In most cases it
would be more accurate to treat the recording acts as merely preserving common law
priorities if the requirements of the acts are fulfilled. See Aigler, "The Operation of
the Recording Acts," 22 MICH. L. REV. 405 (1924).
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not realized that at common law notice was generally immaterial.10 ( d) In
many cases involving easements of implication there is language indicating that
. the courts were thinking in terms of the doctrine of estoppel.11 This doctrine
presupposes fault, and since there is no common law or statutory duty to give
notice it is difficult to find a basis for estoppel.12 ( e) Because unrecorded outstanding interests in land jeopardize certainty of title and detract from the
effectiveness of the recording system, there are strong policy reasons in favor
of the position taken by the trial court.18 However, this deviation from the
common law is not a desirable solution to the problem. In the first place, the
rule as to what will be considered notice of an easement is variable and uncertain.14 Such uncertainty is more likely to lead to litigation. Secondly, the
owner of an unapparent easement is placed in the unenviable position of having
to give notice to all possible purchasers of the servient land without being able
to use the recording system for this purpose. The suggestion by the court in
the principal case that legislation be enacted to bring within the recording acts
easements created by implication and prescription would seem to be the best
solution to the problem.
Howard W. Haftel

10 See Schwartz v. Atlantic Building Company, 41 App. D.C. 108 (1913) holding
that a bona fide purchaser takes land free of a prescriptive easement. Cf. Shaughnessey
v. Leary, 162 Mass. 108, 38 N.E. 197 (1894).
11 In Backhausen v. Mayer, 204 Wis. 286 at 289, 234 N.W. 904 (1931),
quoted and followed in Schmidt v. Hilty-Forster Lumber Co., 239 Wis. 514, 1 N.W.
(2d) 154 (1942), the court spoke of a "negligent grantee who fails to exact an
express covenant granting to him the right of way necessary. • • ." Backhausen v.
Mayer is noted in 29 M1cH. L. REv. 1083 (1931), and in 7 Wis. L. REV. 42
(1931).
12 See Wiesel v. Smira, 49 R.I. 246, 142 A. 148 (1928) and the principal case
(at 524) holding that there is no ground for estoppel.
18 See Hawley v. McCabe, II7 Conn. 558, 169 A. 192 (1933).
•14 In Berlin v. Robbins, 180 Wash. 176, 38 P. (2d) 1047 (1934), the court
imputed to defendant knowledge of an easement by implication:

